Counterparties and Egress
Every third party the platform can send data to, declared in one registry that is the egress inventory, the subprocessor list, and the only source of a credential, and the controls a workspace holds over it.
Every third party the platform sends data to is declared in one registry: the legal entity, the hosts traffic goes to, what leaves, whether it is retained, whether it trains, and which agreements cover it. The registry is the platform's egress inventory, its subprocessor list, and the only door through which a vendor key can be obtained. A customer's connected OAuth accounts are held separately, by the integrations layer. This chapter covers the model, the controls a workspace has over it, how egress works through a company network's proxy, and how the sandbox side of egress completes the picture.
#Counterparties and Surfaces
A counterparty is a legal entity: the party to a Business Associate Agreement, the row on a subprocessor list. A surface is what code references: one credential, one set of egress hosts, one data flow. Many surfaces roll up to one counterparty; one cloud vendor is one agreement over several of its services.
Every surface declares:
| Field | What it says |
|---|---|
| Hosts | The hostnames traffic egresses to, as patterns where a vendor uses per-tenant or per-region subdomains |
| Data classes | What leaves, in the classes the data map also uses for what the platform stores: user content, personal info, credentials, payment details, app code and assets, diagnostics, metadata |
| Retention | Pass-through, stored, or covered by a zero-data-retention agreement |
| Training | Whether the vendor trains on what is sent |
| Exposure | core, reached by using the product at all, or elective, reached only by an action the user chose |
| Category | Model serving, search, scraping, payments, telemetry, and so on |
| Product scope | Which product's execution paths can reach it |
| Credentials | Where the operator's key lives, and whether a workspace may bring its own |
Every counterparty declares its legal name, country, and whether it offers a DPA and a BAA. The agreements a deployment actually holds (signed, with their form, date, and the vendor's public page) and the opt-outs its accounts have made are the deployment's own data file, read over the registry. A self-host therefore never shows the cloud's agreements as its own. Retention and training are asserted from published terms, never guessed; a value the operator has not read is left unknown rather than filled in.
The registry lives in code, one file per counterparty plus two groupings that are not companies (the capabilities the platform runs itself, and customer-hosted model endpoints). A set of CI assertions keeps it whole: every model provider has a surface, every service the catalog can reach has a surface, every OAuth provider is covered, every third-party surface names at least one egress host, every adapter class declares the surface it egresses through, a retired counterparty holds no live bindings, and no code outside the registry reads a vendor key.
#What a Workspace Controls
The registry renders as the workspace's services page. A workspace controls exactly the surfaces some runtime path consults: a service a catalog model resolves to, a single model, and any operator credential that declares the fields a workspace may supply in its place. Every other surface is listed as what it is (core, an integration, customer-supplied, the platform's own, or included with no setting), so nothing that receives data is hidden. For a controllable surface a workspace can:
- Switch it off. A switched-off surface refuses at the clearinghouse with a clear error before any request leaves. Switching off a provider switches off every model it serves; a single model can be switched off on its own. A switched-off vendor stays off whatever the workspace's plan.
- Bring its own key, on any plan. The workspace's key is used only when it is complete for the vendor being called; the adapter then runs with it and the usage bills as own-key. A key that is missing or incomplete refuses rather than falling back to the operator's. A model can be kept on a workspace key while the rest of the provider is switched off.
- Hold every vendor to terms of its own, on Data Settings. No Training refuses, on the operator's keys, any third-party surface that trains on the content it is sent. Signed DPA refuses any surface sent personal data without a signed DPA and a lawful basis for EU transfers. Each is a predicate over the registry's facts and the deployment's agreements, so a vendor declared tomorrow is held to them the day it is declared, and a fact nobody has read meets neither. HIPAA is the same check with a BAA as its predicate, in force with the workspace's agreement. The workspace's own keys and connected accounts stand under all three.
Core surfaces cannot be switched off, because the product cannot function without them. The remedy for those is disclosure, which the registry provides. Every change to these settings is recorded in the workspace's audit log, never with the key.
#The Clearinghouse
One service answers whether a workspace may use a surface, and with which credential. Steps reach it through their execution context, the model factory reaches it when constructing an adapter, and routes reach it directly. The answer is a grant carrying a credential whose source is the operator or the workspace, or a refusal. There are four kinds of refusal:
- The service is switched off by the workspace's choice.
- The workspace's setting asks for its own key, but no complete key is stored behind it.
- A HIPAA workspace asks for the deployment's credentials, but no BAA the deployment holds covers the service.
- The deployment has no key configured on either side.
A model-level setting beats a service-level one. Switched off beats everything. A complete workspace key beats the operator's. A refusal names the company.
Work done for a workspace takes its key only from the clearinghouse and calls with what it was granted. The workspace's switch and a HIPAA workspace's BAA chain therefore apply wherever its data goes, and work on the operator's key is billed to the workspace it was for.
#Disclosure
Because every surface carries exposure, category, product scope, and agreements, the subprocessor list is a rendering of the registry: core infrastructure in one section, services used by features a customer enables in another, each with its data classes and its BAA coverage. The workspace's external services pages render the same records, and the subprocessor list closes with what the platform runs itself (Run by Remy). What any of it keeps, and for how long, belongs to the data map, shown in the workspace's Data Inventory. See Compliance and Attestation.
#Sandbox Egress
The registry governs what the platform sends out. The other half of egress is what an app's own code may reach from its sandbox. That is decided by the network: a sandbox can reach the public internet and nothing internal. See The Trust Boundary. An app that calls a third party directly does so with its own secrets, from its own VM, and that traffic is the app's, not the platform's.
#Through a Network's Proxy
A self-host on a company network often reaches the internet only through the network's forward proxy, which may inspect TLS under the company's own root certificate. The deployment names the proxy in the standard proxy and no-proxy settings, and supplies the proxy's CA file beside its own certificate. Every part of the platform that reaches outside then goes through the proxy and trusts that root:
- the API and the worker, for the model providers, the identity provider, and the vendors reached over plain HTTP fetches;
- the npm registry's connection to npm;
- the media helpers' downloads;
- every sandbox, for an app's own calls, npm, git, and the dev box's browser.
The stack's own hosts never go through it: the deployment's domain, its services by name, and its sandboxes by address. A URL someone handed over is still judged before it is sent, though through a proxy the proxy has the last word on where a name leads.
Integrations whose SDKs bring their own HTTP clients do not go through the proxy yet: the AWS SDK's (Bedrock, the S3 data-source connector, the AWS drivers), Stripe, Twilio, Luma, the speech vendors on WebSockets, and the voice worker. Neither do telemetry export, ClamAV's signature updates, or the Docker daemon's image pulls, which are the host's to configure.
``` Figure 20, "Counterparties and Egress": the registry and what it feeds. Center: the counterparty registry, drawn as a table of counterparties, each expanding into surfaces with badges: hosts, data classes, retention, training, exposure, category, credentials, BAA and DPA. Left inputs: the model catalog (model providers), steps and services, OAuth providers, adapters. Right outputs: - Clearinghouse: for a surface and a workspace, returns either a grant (credential from the operator or the workspace) or a refusal (switched off, workspace key unusable, not covered by a BAA, or not configured). - Workspace services page: switch on or off, bring your own key. - Subprocessor list: core and elective sections, closing with what Remy runs itself. Bottom: the CI assertions drawn around the whole box. Footnote box: "Sandbox egress = network policy (internet only)", pointing to the trust boundary chapter. No trust boundary is drawn in this figure, so there is no crimson.